

TAIWANESE CONSCIOUSNESS (T'AI-WAN I SHIH): FACETS OF A CONTINUING DEBATE

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I

Notwithstanding the regularly publicized official point of view of the two governments in Beijing and Taipei that the island of Taiwan is an unalienable part of China, a considerable part of the population living on Taiwan is not subscribing wholeheartedly to this interpretation. This is not only due to the international status of Taiwan, which is still in need of clarification, socioeconomic and demographic changes have also contributed in putting identities that have been accepted for a long period of time into jeopardy. The potential domestic and international impact exerted by new answers to this question have begun to interest foreign observers, the most outspoken among them perceiving the solution of "Taipei's identity crisis" as a precondition for stabilizing the KMT government's hold on executive power: "Oddly, Taiwanese support (for the KMT leadership) may emerge only if the island develops a new and special sense of identity that is more satisfying and more suitable than simply being 'a part of China', which Americans, KMT Chinese, and communist Chinese all agree it is."¹

The article could not have been published at a more auspicious date, for at about the same time a vivid controversy erupted in Taiwan focusing on the contents and the justification of a Taiwanese or Chinese orientation as the guideline for political action. The catchwords of this controversy, *Chung-kuo i-shih*, *T'ai-wan i-shih*, *Chung-kuo-chieh* and *T'ai-wan-chieh*, soon found their way out of the restricted circles of Tangwai-magazines into the island's public media.

The controversy started by a commentary on the emigration of a Taiwanese pop-star to the Chinese mainland in a Tangwai-magazine originally centered on two questions: had the developments on Taiwan brought forth an indigenous society whose basic characteristics differed from the one on the Chinese mainland and, if that was the case, should the inhabitants of the island identify primarily or exclusively with this society or should they still conceive of themselves as being a part of a larger community encompassing the whole of China.

The problem of Taiwan's identity² and its relations with the Chinese mainland had been raised several times in earlier years. In the early seventies, for example, Chang Chun-hung propagated his concept of Taiwan as a maritime China (*hai-yang Chung-kuo*), with a society differing decisively from that of mainland China. His ideas

did not attract much attention, however, even within the circles of the Tangwai.³ This time, however, the controversy on "consciousness" and "ties" had a considerable press echo. Originally a topic that agitated only the minds and pens of the political opposition it was later taken up also by publications with a politically less distinct point of view.⁴

Although a whole range of issues related to this topic were discussed in the media, the opinions of those polemicists that started the controversy were not taken notice of. This paper will deal primarily with the original controversy, analyzing those articles that deal with the concept or different aspects of a Taiwanese Consciousness (TWIS). This treatise is based on the assumption that such an analysis will offer some insights into the outlook of some of the major groups among the political opposition on Taiwan, belonging to the Tangwai, when it was still existing, or to the newly founded 'Democratic Progressive Party' (*Min-chu chin-pu tang*). A second reason for analyzing this controversy can be found in the importance attached to it by several groups among the Tangwai.

This treatise will deal mainly with the following questions: what are the central elements of a Taiwanese Consciousness? Which circumstances promoted its development? Which groups among those people living on Taiwan are considered 'Taiwanese'? And finally: how do the polemicists view the relations between China and Taiwan? It is not the aim of this paper to take issue with the factual truth or the scientific correctness of the opinions contained in the different articles, but to clarify some aspects of a Weltanschauung that guides the actions of several important groups among the political opposition on Taiwan. Before this analysis will be taken up, a short survey on the course of the debate and its main participants might be appropriate.

II

A considerable number of those articles written in defense of the concept of a TWIS aimed simply at putting the arguments of the advocates of a Chinese Consciousness (CKIS) into doubt. To further the understanding of the points debated and the arguments brought forward, a short outline of the main arguments raised by the advocates of CKIS might be helpful. Discussing the motives that induced Hou Te-chien to leave Taiwan and settle in the PRC, Ch'en Ying-chen mentioned several of the core arguments in favour of CKIS.⁵ Citing several passages taken from one of Hou's most famous songs as a proof, Ch'en contends that they are the reflection of an emotion shared by all Chinese. This emotion, developed during the several thousand years of Chinese history, is common to all Chinese be they Taiwanese (*pen-sheng-jen*) or Mainlanders (*wai-sheng-jen*). Ch'en explicitly denies that substantial distinctions exist between Taiwanese and those Mainlanders living on Taiwan. Those differences that obviously exist are caused by temporal influences, the different date of arrival on Taiwan.⁶ Therefore the equation sometimes put forward by adherents of TWIS, that Chinese are oppressors and rulers, while Taiwanese are

oppressed and exploited, is not only incorrect, Ch'en interprets this perception as the expression of a reactionary petty-bourgeois class consciousness, held by some groups of the Taiwanese population.⁷ Contrasting with this particularistic perception, which he calls 'Taiwanism' (*T'ai-wan-jen chu-i*), Ch'en's terminology the equivalent of TWIS, is Ch'en's own version of a Chinese nationalism: "Nationalism is this kind of self-perception by China and the Chinese; it is this struggle for advancement, progress, development, solidarity and peace for China and the Chinese; it is the consciousness of struggling for China and the Chinese to make their necessary contribution to the peace, the progress and the development for the world and the other nations. All this is predicated on the existence of a free, democratic, solidary and nationalistic environment. After countless bitter sacrifices more and more Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits are becoming aware of this necessity and are willing to fight for China's freedom, democracy and national solidarity."⁸

These core elements of a CKIS were further elaborated in several articles, written by people belonging to 'China Tide Magazine' (*Hsia-ch'ao lun-t'an*) [HCLT]. One important aspect raised in these articles dealt with the question whether it was legitimate to speak about the Taiwanese, in other words, whether the inhabitants of Taiwan should be conceived of as forming one group with one common consciousness. This problem was approached in a different ways. The main argument tried to put the concept of one group with one consciousness into doubt. In the context of a wide-ranging discussion on TWIS and related topics between Ch'en Ying-chen and Tai Kuo-hui, considerable emphasis is given to the fact that the inhabitants of Taiwan belong to several distinct groups (Gaoshan, Hoklo, Hakka, Mainlander) that do not and did not share a common consciousness. TWIS, according to both discussants, is simply the expression of an outlook prevalent among the Hoklos.⁹ The existence of a common consciousness is also disputed by Chao Ting-i. Analysing the different classes existing in Taiwanese society and asking, which interest each class pursues, he arrives at the - predictable - conclusion that there are no interests common to the classes of employers, self-employed, family dependents who are not paid for their work, and labourers.¹⁰

The second line of argument took issue with the notion that TWIS and CKIS are necessarily opposed to each other. Ch'en tries to disprove this position by citing examples that there are no differences between Taiwanese and Mainlanders and that cooperation between them is possible.¹¹

A different group of arguments brought forward against TWIS by the advocates of CKIS was based on an anti-imperialist perspective that evaluated other ideas on the basis of their potential contribution to the establishment of an autonomous Taiwan free from the interference of foreign economic interests. According to this line of reasoning Taiwan can become autonomous only if it pursues an anti-imperialistic course. Taiwan is lacking one precondition for autonomy, however, namely sufficient physical resources. Under these circumstances a teaming-up with China is

desirable, because of its abundance of resources as well as its cultural and historical proximity to Taiwan.¹²

Although the unfolding debate on TWIS and CKIS was confined at this stage to opposition circles it soon gained in intensity and acrimony. Advocates of both positions developed a propensity for polemics and did not hesitate to engage in attacks on the personal and intellectual integrity of their opponents. Not all of the groups in the Tangwai felt compelled to enter the debate, though. Those who took part were associated with a more radical course of opposition against the ruling KMT-government, the HCLT-group with a more leftist orientation being the stronghold of CKIS, while people affiliated to the magazine 'Sheng-ken' and its numerous branch publications under different titles acted as standard bearer for TWIS. Neither the magazines affiliated with the group around K'ang Ning-hsiang nor Lin Chen-chieh's magazine 'Progress' (*Ch'ien-chin chou-k'an*) did participate in the polemic, except for publishing an occasional report on its development. Within the more radical camp of the opposition, however, the argument reached such proportions that it was compared to veritable line-struggle.¹³

Several years after the original debate on CKIS and TWIS had subsided, a topic closely related to the concept of TWIS, that of the relationship between a Taiwanese Identity and Taiwanese culture was discussed in considerable detail in several magazines close to the political opposition, mainly 'T'ai-wan wen-i' (TWWI), 'T'ai-wan hsin wen-hua' (TWHWH) and the rather shortlived republication 'Hsin Ch'ao-liu/The Movement Monthly'.

Public interest in the debate as well as the potential implications of the topics discussed involving the official position of the government on the relation between Taiwan and China induced other publications not affiliated with the Tangwai to enter into a discussion of this many sided problem. CKLT, to give just one example, chose it as the leading topic of two specific issues, in addition to several articles published in other issues.¹⁴ Among the plethora of aspects raised in these articles only two shall be briefly taken up here since they are related to the subject of our analysis: the historical problem of locating the period when a TWIS was formed, and the sociological one of the spread of an identification with Taiwan among different groups of Taiwan's population after 1949.

As will be discussed later on there are strong differences of opinion among adherents of TWIS concerning the date of as well as the circumstances that led to the formation of TWIS. Yin Chang-i argues in his study of the historical development that TWIS appeared only during the times of Japanese colonial rule over Taiwan.¹⁵ This consciousness developed out of an experience of inequality, of the unequal treatment the colonial power accorded to Japanese and Chinese inhabitants of the island. According to Yin, the consciousness that did develop out of this experience did not perceive of the Chinese inhabitants of Taiwan as a group that was different

from both Japanese and Chinese, what distinguished the Chinese inhabitants of Taiwan from their Japanese rulers was precisely the fact that they were Chinese.¹⁶ The circumstances existing during the colonial period, however, facilitated the development of a feeling of confrontation that could under different circumstances be mobilized against groups other than the Japanese.

Concerning the development and diffusion of different kinds of consciousness or identifications, Huang Kuang-kuo proposed to differentiate the two main orientations CKIS and TWIS into several subcategories, namely a conservative and a democratic CKIS on one side, a 'Hsiang-t'u i-shih, and a realistic 'T'ai-tu' (Taiwan Independence) TWIS on the other side. When related to each other they developed tensions of different intensity. Analysing intellectual tendencies on Taiwan since 1949 Huang discovered a pattern of ascent and descent with regard to the predominance of the different categories.¹⁷ Following the suppression of TWIS in the wake of February 28, 1947 democratic CKIS gained a position of predominance in the sixties till the beginning of the seventies. After a short period of coexistence between democratic CKIS and realistic TWIS in the early nineteen-seventies the different forms of TWIS gained in importance and started to conflict with each other, while democratics CKIS has practically disappeared. Aided by the government the position of the conservative CKIS has remained stable during this period.

Huang's findings are corroborated by the results of a study by Hsiao Hsin-huang on the development and diffusion of a sense of attachment to Taiwan among some group of intellectuals in the period between the late forties and the early eighties.¹⁸ Hsiao discovers a growing interest in the social situation on Taiwan that leads to an identification with the island's social reality among the sociologists, a process Hsiao calls the development of a 'Hsiang-t'u i-shih' (HTIS), 'hsiang-t'u' having the somewhat larger connotation of existing social conditions. Whereas the development of this consciousness among the sociologists began only in the late sixties, several groups of writers standing in the tradition of a 'Hsiang-t'u wen-hsueh' showed a strong attachment to Taiwan during the whole period under consideration. Since the beginning of the seventies HTIS started to incorporate a concern for new developments, for example socioeconomic change on the island itself or adverse developments in Taiwan's foreign relations. Being confronted with challenges of this kind the safeguarding of Taiwan is considered a priority.

III

The majority of the articles written by adherents of TWIS try to show the incompatibility of being Taiwanese and maintaining a CKIS. Even those articles that deal with aspects of TWIS itself are focusing more on the historical or sociological circumstances of its development than on describing its contents.

In what is probably the most thorough exposition of TWIS, its development and its relevance for politics on Taiwan, Ch'en Shu-hung approaches his subject from several different angles, historical, political and social.¹⁹ According to his opinion the most important obstacle to the development of democracy and freedom on Taiwan lies in the repressive political system based on the negation of a 'consciousness of Taiwan's reality' (*T'ai-wan hsien-shih i-shih*).²⁰ This consciousness is explained by Ch'en as being the result of a social and economic development. In the course of the economic development programmes initiated by the Japanese colonial government Taiwan changed into an integrated area, destroying the barriers that had up to that time separated the different groups of Taiwan's population and enforced a sense of community only with one's own group. The integration of Taiwan into one economic area established the precondition for the development of a common consciousness (*kung-t'ung i-shih*) among its population. According to Ch'en the nationalistic activities undertaken on Taiwan during the nineteen twenties were the first expression of this new consciousness.

The outcome of WWII did not result in any substantive changes of these objective conditions. The mainlanders who came to Taiwan in the late forties were also exposed to their influence and have become a part of Taiwan's society. The rapid industrialization of Taiwan that started in the sixties only served to strengthen this development. According to Ch'en's opinion both the debate on 'Hsiang-t'u wen-hsueh' and the democracy movement demonstrate that TWIS is beginning to influence all layers of Taiwan's society.²¹

Capitalist penetration of the island's economy has resulted in moulding Taiwan into a distinct entity that has been further consolidated by its political realities. Objective conditions such as these are the main reasons for the obvious differences between Taiwan and China: both societies are based on different economic and political systems and identify with a different consciousness. The heterogeneous nature of the two societies is the result of different historical circumstances and economic developments, therefore these differences cannot be overcome by ties of blood.²² The continuing socioeconomic change on Taiwan and the emergence of new classes like an indigenous class of capitalists and a middle class will further strengthen the influence of TWIS.

A number of authors argue along similar lines and conceive of TWIS mainly as being the product of specific socioeconomic conditions.²³ The existence of an immediate relationship between objective conditions and subjective consciousness assumed by Ch'en in explaining the development of TWIS, however, is not accepted. While Ch'en assumed that specific socioeconomic conditions would lead with necessity to the development of a similar consciousness among those people living under the influence of these conditions, both Yeh and Huang conceived of this relationship as being of a more mediate nature. Even if the relationship between reality and consciousness would operate along the lines described by Ch'en, the possibility of a

subjective interpretation of historical experience and thus of subjective identification with a consciousness not in accordance with reality would still exist. Two objections are raised against Ch'en's rather mechanistic concept of interaction. It is of greater importance to establish which of the two subjective identifications, TWIS or CKIS, is more in line with Taiwan's historical experience. None of the authors, however, is able to offer a standard for comparison. A second objection is raised against the materialistic concept of history itself, irrespective of the basic orientation of its appliers, be they adherents of TWIS like Ch'en himself or advocates of CKIS like the HCLT group. In both cases the deterministic nature of the materialistic concept of history is depriving the people of its right to choose their own political identity.²⁴

A second approach puts more emphasis on certain historical experiences as the major explanation for the development of TWIS. Opinions differ, however, which experience exerted more influence on the development and the time of its formation. Some argue that emigration to Taiwan itself constituted the decisive experience. According to this line of reasoning, TWIS has been in existence since the first Han Chinese settled on Taiwan.²⁵ According to Kao the most decisive experience has been that of exploitation and oppression of Taiwan by imperialistic powers, that started very early in Taiwan's history. China - be it represented by Cheng Ch'eng-kung or the institutions of the Ch'ing Dynasty - is conceived of as being an imperialistic power similar to the other imperialistic nations that had occupied Taiwan. Kao's perception of Taiwan as an independent entity is expressed most clearly by his remark that the history of Taiwan does not constitute a part of China's history.²⁶

Most authors, however, conceive of the fifty years of Japanese colonial rule as the formative period of TWIS. The experience of oppression helped to develop an attitude of resistance against those in power. This definition of TWIS is largely identical with the one given by Yeh Shih-t'ao in one of his contributions to the polemic on 'Hsiang-t'u wen-hsueh'. Yeh remarked: "Since the whole history of social changes on Taiwan is a history of oppression and humiliation, therefore, the so-called Taiwanese consciousness - the common experience of the Chinese living on Taiwan - is nothing but the common experience of colonialisation and oppression".²⁷

An interesting definition of TWIS was formulated by Hsieh Ch'ang-t'ing. Analysing the relationship between TWIS and Taiwanese culture, Hsieh distinguished different kinds of TWIS. One kind consists of a sense of belonging to a certain area, a province for example, which is determined by ties of blood to the place of birth (*ch'u-shen hsieh-t'ung*). The second kind consists of the ties that connect the person to the place where he lives (*chu-min i-shih*).²⁸ All efforts should be exerted in order to spread this second kind of TWIS with the aim of establishing a consciousness of common destiny for all those living on Taiwan (*T'ai-wan tao ming-yun kung-t'ung-t'i ti i-shih*).²⁹

It is common knowledge that considerable tensions are still existing between those Chinese already living on Taiwan before 1945 and those who emigrated to Taiwan from the Chinese mainland in the period 1945-1949.³⁰ Under these circumstances any attempt to use the experiences and the consciousness of only one group of the island's population as the fundamentals for its political orientation runs the danger of offending the other groups and thus to further heighten the tensions.

This danger seems to be very obvious in those articles that attempt to prove the existence of ethnical differences between Taiwanese and Chinese. Several authors argue that such differences exist, at least with regard to the Hoklos. According to their point of view this group has strong ethnic ties with the *Yueh* that used to live in those areas of Fukien from which the first emigrants to Taiwan originated.³¹

The majority of those arguing in favour of TWIS, however, share the opinion that all the people living on Taiwan should be considered Taiwanese, including those of mainlander origin, though this view is sometimes qualified to include only those who were born in Taiwan. There is a common understanding that either the influence of the objective circumstances existing on Taiwan or the continuing separation of Taiwan from the mainland has had a debilitating effect on the emotional ties that may have bound mainlanders to their place of origin. The question whether TWIS might not aggravate the tensions between the groups (*sheng-chi mao-tun*) on Taiwan is therefore answered in the negative by Ch'en Shu-hung: "The answer has to be negative. Since Taiwanese society has already developed into one political and economic whole, as we have shown before, there is no possibility for those so-called mainlanders (*wai-sheng-jen*) to remain. There is neither the possibility nor are there any indications that they would form a different whole. Therefore it is not correct to talk about contradictions between groups of different provincial affiliations, there only exists a contradiction between the individual identification and the objective circumstances. Given the progress of the democracy movement, the gradual awakening (of the mainlanders) to the fact that their destiny is closely connected to that of the 18 million (Taiwanese) and with the general identification with TWIS this contradiction will dissolve by necessity. There is only this way in front of us."³²

Although most advocates of TWIS subscribe to the desirability of this view there are doubts that this situation has already been achieved. That Taiwanese is still regarded by many people as being equivalent in meaning with Hoklo is admitted by Hsieh Ch'ang-t'ing³³ and others.

A different approach in determining whether a person should be considered to be Taiwanese is suggested by Hung Wei-jen: individual identification with Taiwan.³⁴ In a short analysis he traces the origin of the term 'Taiwan' back to the people it originally designated, showing that it only designated one group among the island's aboriginal population. According to the author's point of view, Taiwan today is only a geographical term, denoting the island of Taiwan itself, Penghu and the surrounding

small islands. According to this understanding, the term Taiwanese not only denotes Gaoshan, Hakka and Hoklo, but also all those descendants of mainlander origin that were born in Taiwan, and *all* languages spoken by the different groups on Taiwan should be considered to be Taiwanese (*T'ai-wan-hua*). The only criterion for determining whether a person is Taiwanese or not is his willingness to identify with Taiwan.³⁵

The perception that the inhabitants of Taiwan have already been integrated into one nation is definitely a minority opinion. Hung Chin-sheng argues that a process of nation-building began under Japanese colonial rule, citing the formation of a common consciousness, i.e. opposition against unjust rule, and the progressive disappearance of those barriers separating the different population groups as evidence. Although this process came to a temporary halt caused by the Japanese defeat and the establishment of Chinese rule on the island it has in the meantime succeeded in integrating the 'new emigrants' into the Taiwanese population.³⁶

This process of nation-building is not yet completed, however. There still exist cleavages between groups of the population, but no contradictions. Even the conflict between the rulers, the so-called *pai-hua*, denoting the ruling elite of mainlanders, and the ruled, the Taiwanese, is considered by Hung as a discrepancy that will be dissolved by historical development.³⁷

V

We have already mentioned the conviction shared by many adherents of TWIS, that substantial differences distinguish Taiwan from China, be they divergent historical experiences or socioeconomic developments. Detailed discussions of the past and future relations between Taiwan and China, however, were rarely undertaken in the context of the early polemic on TWIS. The participants in the discussion on the relationship between consciousness and culture show greater interest in this topic, probably encouraged by the more relaxed attitude assumed by the government. Public advocacy of Taiwanese independence, however, is still considered a criminal offence by the authorities.³⁸

Cheng Ch'in-jen's analysis of the relation between Taiwan and China is based on the assumption that accurate knowledge of the past is the precondition for adequate action in the future.³⁹ He is convinced that the description of past relations between Taiwan and China transmitted in the history textbooks on Taiwan is distorted. According to his research these relations were characterised primarily by political and military confrontations if they existed at all, for a complete suspension of relations prevailed most of the time. Cultural interflow, however, was rather limited. Under these circumstances the Chinese society that evolved in Taiwan developed traits similar to those that characterise maritime nations (*hai-yang-hsing kuo-chia*). Cheng mentions among others the prevalence of a sense of liberty,

openness and advancement among its inhabitants and a distinct orientation towards the outer areas in its economic activities.

The problems confronting Taiwan at present like those of Taiwan's sovereignty, lack of investments, competition from other Asian NICs, growing corruption, and the danger of an increasing reliance on mainland China's economy could, according to Cheng's opinion, be solved most easily by continuing Taiwan's traditional role as a maritime country. It is of equal importance to reintroduce this concept into the political consciousness of the Taiwanese population since it has been lost due to the endeavours of a government orientated exclusively towards mainland China. Concerning its relations to the outside world, Taiwan should bear in mind that its relations with mainland China have in the past been dominated by conflicts. Due to geostrategical reasons Taiwan shares a range of similar interests with Japan and Okinawa.⁴⁰

A similar frame of reference is employed by Yao Chia-wen in his analysis on the future political and economic orientation of Taiwan. He, too, bases his analysis on a continuing conflict between a continental and a maritime orientation. Concerning the island's geostrategical position he argues that Taiwan is located within a parallelogram of powers represented by China, Japan, the USA and the USSR. The orientation offering the greatest advantages for Taiwan should be directed, according to Yao, towards Japan and the USA.⁴¹

VI

I would like to discuss one final aspect of the debates on TWIS in this paper. Among those circles assuming that Taiwan has developed an identity different from that of China, the idea that Taiwanese culture is endangered has become widely accepted. Occasionally, the necessity for a complete reconstruction of Taiwanese culture is set forth.

The term culture as used in these debates denotes the patterns of behaviour and the moral values of the population.⁴² Great stress is put on culture's capacity to provide a sense of orientation and identity to the members of a society.⁴³

What then are the symptoms of the decay that is threatening Taiwanese culture, a decay so alarming as to induce the editorial board of a Tangwai magazine to choose the headline "Don't let the Taiwanese disappear" (*Pu-jang T'ai-wan-jen ts'ung ti-ch'iu shang hsiao-shih*) for a series of articles on the relation between language and consciousness.⁴⁴ The symptoms mentioned by observers are manifold and comprise a broad range of subjects, including the general decline in everyday behaviour as well as the adverse impact of Chinese political culture. The most inclusive critique of the present state of Taiwanese culture has been written by Sung Tsu-lai, beginning with the moral defects of the individual Taiwanese and the resultant defective behaviour.⁴⁵

There is a general agreement on the decline of public morals. Taiwan is credited with the highest crime rate per capita. given the circumstances prevailing on the island the population is forced to tolerate and even emulate certain kinds of illegal behaviour as the only way to survive according to the opinion of one critic.⁴⁶ Illegal behaviour is thought to be widespread in the administration as well, taking such forms as corruption, special rights (*t'e-ch'Gan*), or usurpation of power.

Opinions are divided regarding the causes for these developments, though two lines of arguments are predominant. The socioeconomic approach stresses the influences of a capitalistic economic system, the rapid changes in the social structure as a consequence of economic growth and the transition from an agricultural to an industrial society, and the unequal distribution of the fruits of economic growth.⁴⁷

The majority of explanations, however, points to cultural-political factors as reasons for cultural decline. According to this point of view the decline is directly related to the establishment of the nationalist regime on Taiwan, its educational policies and the political culture of its ruling elite. Li Ch'iao points out that due to the influence of Chinese culture Taiwanese culture has lost its original principles and thus its sense of direction.⁴⁸

The political landscape on Taiwan is blamed from many sides for the negative developments on Taiwan. According to this perception the nationalist regime succeeded in establishing the predominance of politics over all other areas of society and thus created a situation where the shortcomings of the Chinese political culture could make their impact felt not only within the political sphere but also in those areas that are part of the society. Since Taiwan has been devoid of an indigenous political force for most of the time since 1949 there never has been a chance to resist this development.

Several authors are convinced that the nationalist government employed measures designed to destroy the whole sphere of Taiwanese culture, language, literature, popular arts etc. as part of a planned policy.⁴⁹

The imminent danger of a loss of the native language looms foremost in the mind of many critics since the native language is perceived as the most important medium for establishing an identification with Taiwan. The policy of the KMT to establish Mandarin (*Kuo-yu*) as the official language on Taiwan deprives the Taiwanese people of several opportunities, those mentioned include the formation of a distinctly Taiwanese outlook on life. By disseminating their own language the ruling classes are able to impose their own value system on the Taiwanese leaving them without a chance for resistance.⁵⁰ The KMT's cultural policies are comparable to those employed by a colonial government that use the destruction of the value system of its colonial population and its replacement with their own Weltanschauung.

as a means to prevent the development of opposition, a process that has been analyzed by Frantz Fanon.⁵¹

The ways designed to avert the decline of Taiwanese culture are as numerous as the reasons given for this development. Three basic approaches dominate the discussion: the organization of social and political movements, the internationalization of Taiwanese culture, and the formation of a 'Taiwanism' (*T'ai-wan chu-i*).

According to the opinion of Chao T'ien-i Taiwanese culture is in need of a complete reconstruction.⁵² This reconstruction offers a chance to find solutions for those areas of Taiwanese culture that is considered to be insufficient while at the same time incorporating those elements that are considered necessary for the development of the Taiwanese society and culture of the future. Opinions on what elements should be included differ among the participants of several roundtable discussions according to the individual preferences. The suggestions made by Li Ch'iao are indicative of the magnitude of this task. Li asks for a revival of the pioneer spirit (*i-min ch'ing-shen*) with its accompanying characteristics like romanticism, solidarity etc., a democratic, open and outspoken culture, the virtue of solidarity, the spiritual virtues preached by the Presbyterian Church as well as the rule of law inherited from the Japanese. The new culture should stress indigenization (*pen-t'u-hua*), liberalization and establish "a healthy TWIS".⁵³

VII

In spite of their often polemical quality, the articles discussing aspects of TWIS reveal that the advocates of TWIS share certain convictions. The diversity of — sometimes contradictory — arguments advanced in support of the concept as a whole or of individual aspects, however, indicate that TWIS has not yet developed into a coherent ideology. Notwithstanding considerable differences over details, all adherents of TWIS share the opinion that the society on Taiwan has developed an identity that is different from that of mainland China, as a result of different historical influences or of an independent path of socioeconomic development. Concerning the future relations between the two societies they advocate a deepening of the already existing differences through a conscious promotion of Taiwanese culture. A similar inclination is apparent in the domains of economics and politics. Adherents of TWIS argue that Taiwan would reap greater rewards by maintaining and strengthening its ties with the leading industrial nations of the Pacific area, Japan and the USA, than by a rapprochement with the Chinese mainland.

Contradictions and misrepresentations contained in some of the arguments in favour of TWIS or in the description of its historical development may provide an excellent basis for future dispute among intellectuals. Unfortunately, not all ideas raised during the debates will agitate only the minds and bring forward some stinging remarks, some may prove to be politically divisive. Treatises that postulate a neces-

sary relationship between being Taiwanese and adhering to certain political attitudes, especially as far as the relations with China and the present political system on Taiwan is concerned, may, quite inadvertently, provide the basis for future denunciations of those adhering to other convictions.

The relevance of the polemic between CKIS and TWIS is not restricted to the intellectual sphere, however. It served to accentuate the importance attached to the national question by some groups among the political opposition on Taiwan. In the early nineteen eighties, this issues tended to be left in the background compared with the main issues of democratization and liberalization. Although of comparatively minor importance, this commitment exerted a certain influence in the formation of several groups among the opposition, the second important factor consisted of an explicit identification with certain strata of Taiwanese society. It also played a role in the differentiation of the political opposition on Taiwan in 1986/87 and attenuated the centripetal trend towards a single opposition party.

Those groups among the former 'Tangwai' that had a preference for CKIS were among the prime movers for setting-up a second opposition party, the 'Kung-tang', that in addition to its orientation towards promoting the interests of industrial workers also showed distinctive traits of 'Chung-kuo-chieh'.⁵⁴ They also form one of the largest groups among those participating in the establishment of the 'T'ung-i lien-meng', an organisation whose main objective consists of promoting interest in China among the inhabitants of Taiwan and that is critical of the China-policies of the 'Chin-pu min-chu tang' (DPP) as well as the KMT.

The majority of the adherents of TWIS have either joined the DPP or are active in those groups and associations that concentrate on issues like the advancement of Taiwanese culture or literature. Ideologically close to the DPP these groups occasionally play the role of interest groups, promoting causes that the DPP cannot or will not pursue with similar intensity.

Although the debate over TWIS and CKIS, 'Chung-kuo-chieh' and 'T'ai-wan-chieh' has subsided for the time being, the commitments that motivated the participants will continue to influence the political scene on Taiwan, at least as long as the relationship between China and Taiwan remains unsettled.

NOTES

1. Cross, Charles T.: Taipei's Identity Crisis. In: *Foreign Policy* 51 (Summer 1983), p. 59-60.
2. Concern for this problem is not limited to political activists. A continuing preoccupation with this theme is also discernible among writers living on Taiwan. See Hegel, Robert F.; The Search for Identity in Fiction from Taiwan. In: Hegel, Robert F. and Richard C. Hessny, eds.; *Expression of Self in Chinese Literature*, New York 1985, p. 342-360.

3. Chang expounded his ideas in several articles. Comp. Chang Chun-hung; Ts'ung ta-lu wen-hua ho hai-yang wen-hua t'an tao tang-ch'ien jen-t'ung ti wen-t'i. In: *Ching-han hsuen-chi*. Taipei 1978, p. 472-494. After his release from prison he took the idea up again in several lectures and interviews on the prospects of Taiwanese culture. Comp. Chang Chun-hung; Hsien-yen wen-hua ti hui-ku yu T'ai-wan ch'ien-t'u chan-wang. In: *T'ai wan wen-i* No. 107 (September/October 1987), p. 6-16.

4. One of the magazines most interested in this topic was 'Chung-kuo lun-t'an', which in addition to several articles published in a number of issues devoted one issue exclusively to the discussion of this problem. See its issue No. 289 published October 10, 1987.

5. Ch'en Ying-chen; Hsiang-che keng k'uan-k'uang ti li-shih shih-yeh. In: *Ch'ien-chin chou-k'an* No. 12 (June 1984). Quotes are taken from the collection of articles on the controversy edited by Shih Min-hui; *T'ai-wan i-shih lun-chan hsuan-chi*. (TWISLCHC) Monterey Park/CA 1985, p. 31-37.

6. Ch'en Ying-chen; Wei-le min-tsu ti t'uan-chieh yu ho-p'ing. In: *TWISLCHC*, p. 61-66.

7. Ch'en Ying-chen; see above, Note 4. The equation is as follows: Chinese = oppressor = ruler; Taiwanese = oppressed = exploited.

8. Ch'en Ying-chen; *op.cit.*, p. 36-37.

9. Tai Kuo-hui and Ch'en Ying-chen; T'ai-wan-jen i-shih, Tai-wan min-tsu ti hsu-hsiang yu chen-hsiang. In: *TWISLCHC*, p. 90-91. An unabridged version of this conversation is included in Tai Kuo-hui; *T'ai-wan-shih yen-chiu*. Taipei 1985, p. 142-179.

10. Chao Ting-i; Chui-chiu 'T'ai-wan i-ch'ien-pa-pai-wan jen' lun. In: *HCLT* (March 1984), 14-18. Quoted from *TWISLCHC*, p. 17.

11. Ch'en Ying-chen mentions the magazine *Tzu-you Chung-kuo* as a good example to prove his point. The editorial board of the magazine was staffed with both Taiwanese and Mainlanders, both cooperated well in order to achieve their aims. See *TWISLCHC*, p. 82.

12. Chiang Hsun; T'ai-wan min-tsu chu-i. In: *Ch'ien-chin chou-k'an* No. 16, p. 61.

13. Chiang Hsun, for example, thought that a division of the Tangwai into contending camps due to this debate was more than just a distant possibility. See his 'Hsieh Ch'ang-t'ing tui Chao Shao-k'ang: I-shih hsing-t'ai ti huang-hun. In: *Nan Fang* No. 6 (April 1987), p. 34.

14. The contents of *CKLT* No. 266 (25.10.1986) and No. 289 (10.10.1987) are both largely dedicated to articles dealing with the topic of 'Chung-kuo-chieh' yu 'T'ai-wan-chieh'.

15. Yin Chang-i; T'ai-wan i-shih chih-shih ti fa-chan. In: *CKLT* NO. 266, p. 19-25. Two other works by Yin also deal with aspects of this problem: T'ai-wan i-shih, T'ai-wan yu wen-hsueh. In: Yin Chang-i; *T'ai-wan chin-tai-shih lun*. Taipei 1986, p. 201-239 and T'ai-wan i-shih shih-hsi - li-shih ti kuan-tien. In: *CKLT* NO. 289, p. 95-112.

16. Yin, *op.cit.*, p. 24.

17. Huang Kuang-kuo; 'T'ai-wan-chieh' yu 'Chung-kuo-chieh': tui-k'ang yu ch'u-lu. In: *CKLT* No. 289, p. 1-19.

18. Hsiao Hsin-huang; Tang-tai chih-shih fen-tzu ti 'Hsiang-t'u i-shih'. In: *CKLT* No. 265 (10.10.1986), p. 56-57.

19. Chen Shu-hung; T'ai-wan i-shih - tang-wai min-chu yun-tung ti chih-shih. In: *Sheng-ken* (*Senh-kin*) No. 12 (10.7.1983), pp. 17-20.

20. *op.cit.*; In: *TWISLCHC*, p. 192.

21. *op.cit.*; p. 194.

22. *op.cit.*; p. 201.

23. This perspective is put forward very clearly in Huang Lien-teh; Hsi-tiao chung-kuo je-hun-cheng ti 'k'e hsueh' chuang pa. In: *TWISLCHC*, p. 133-151 and Yeh A-ming; I-shih yu ts'un-ts'ai - ts'ai lun T'ai-wan i-shih. In: *Sheng-ken* No. 15 (25.8.1983), p. 27-30.

24. Huang; *op.cit.*; p. 148.

25. See Sung Tzu-lai; T'ai-wan tzu-wo i-shih ti ch'eng-ch'ang yu wan-ch'eng. In: *TWHWH* No. 6 (February 1987), p. 48. A similar argument is put forward by Ch'en Yun in his article 'Ts'ung i-min ti T'ai-wan-shih shih-chieh 'Chung-kuo-chieh' yu 'T'ai-wan-chieh''. In: *TWISLCHC*, p. 67-76.

26. Kao I-ko; T'ai-wan li-shih i-shih wen-t'i. In: T'ai-wan nien-tai ts'a-chih (March 1984) [*TWNT*], cited from *TWISLCHC*, p. 163-171. According to Kao Taiwan's history consists of the development of the relations between three ethnic groups living on Taiwan, Gaoshan, Hakka, and Hoklo.

27. Yeh Shih-t'ao; T'ai-wan hsiang-t'u wen-hsueh-shih tao-lun. In: Yu Tien-ts'ung, ed.; *Hsiang-t'u wen-hsueh t'ao-lun-chi*. Taipei 1978, p. 73.

28. Hsieh Ch'ang-t'ing; Hsin ti T'ai-wan i-shih he hsin-ti T'ao-wan wen-hua. In: *TWHWH* No. 8 (May 1987), p. 6.

29. *op.cit.*; p. 8.

30. The intensity characterising the tensions existing between Taiwanese and Mainlanders is considered by some observers to be one of Taiwan's most pressing political problems. See Hsu Feng-chih; Wei sheng-chi mao-tun chao chieh-yao. In: *Hsin Hsin-wen chou-k'an* No. 3 (5.4.1987), p. 16.

31. This argument is put forward by several authors, among them are Lin Cho-shui and Sung Tzu-lai. See Lin Cho-shui; 'Hsia-ch'ao lun-t'an' fan 'T'ai-wan-jen i-shih' lun ti p'eng-chieh. In: *TWNT* (March 1984), cited from *TWISLCHC*, p. 153-162 and Sung Tzu-lai; T'ai-wan tzu-wo i-shih ti ch'eng-ch'ang yu wan-ch'eng. *op.cit.*

32. Ch'en Shu-hung; *op.cit.*, p. 204.

33. Hsieh Ch'ang-t'ing; *op.cit.*, p. 6.

34. Hung Wei-jen; Shen-ma shih T'ai-wan-jen, T'ai-wan-yu. In: *TWHWH* No. 10 (July 1987), p. 27-32.

35. *op.cit.*, p. 30.

36. Hung Chin-sheng; T'ai-wan min-tzu ti yen-sheng. In: *TWHWH* No. 12 (September 1987), p. 26.

37. *op.cit.*, p. 28.

38. The idea that Taiwan is 'a new and independent nation', articulated for the first time in the 'Declaration of Human Rights by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, August 16, 1977' was only mentioned

once, however. See Wang Shih-hsun; Hsin erh tu-li ti li-hsiang chih kuo. In: *TWHWH* No. 11 (August 1987), p. 5-10.

39. Cheng Ch'in-jen; T'ai-wan hsien-tai i-shih ti wen-t'i - li-shih ch'ing-chieh yu hsien-shih ti chiu-ke. In: *TWWI* No. 106 (July-August 1987), p. 51-61.

40. Cheng; *op.cit.*, p. 58-59.

41. Yao Chia-wen; T'ai-wan wang ho ch'u ch'u? In: *TWWI* No. 105 (May-June 1987), p. 8-20.

42. To mention just an example of this approach see Hsieh Ch'ang-t'ing's lecture during the discussion on 'T'ai-wan wen-hua t'i-chih kai-ts'ao'. In: *TWWI* No. 106 (July-August 1987), p. 41.

43. See the lecture given by Li Ch'iao on the same occasion. In: *op.cit.*, p. 39.

44. See p. 21 of issue No. 1 of the republication of *Hsin Ch'ao-liu/The Movement Monthly* (May 15, 1986).

45. Sung's complete list of personal deficiencies reads as follows: lack of self-insight, self-identity, self-acceptance, self-esteem, and self-disclosure. See Sung Tzu-lai; T'ai-wan-jen ti tzu-wo chui-hsun chi wen-hua ts'ai-sheng. In: *TWHWH* No. 4 (December 1986), p. 12-13.

46. Hsieh Ch'ang-t'ing; T'ai-wan wen-hua ti wei-chi yu ch'u-lu. In: *TWHWH* No. 2 (October 1986), p. 9.

47. Hsu Shui-lu; Shih-lun 'T'ai-wan hsin wen-hua yun-tung'. In: *TWHWH* No. 6 (February 1987), p. 53.

48. Li Ch'iao, lecture given at the 'T'ai-wan wen-hua t'i-chih kai-ts'ao' yen-chiang-hui. *op.cit.*, p. 53.

49. Hsu Shui-lu; *op.cit.*, p. 53.

50. Laio Li, Yang Pi-chuo; K'ung-chih ni ti yu-yen hsiao-mieh ni-ti li-shih. In: *Hsin Ch'ao-liu* No. 1 (May 15, 1986), p. 22-27.

51. T'u Ch'iou; Wo-men pu-shih i-hsiang-jen. In: *Hsin Ch'ao-liu* No. 1 (May 15, 1986), p. 35.

52. Chao T'ien-i; concluding remarks made in the discussion on 'Chien-yen T'ai-wan i-shih yu Chung-kuo i-shih'. In: *TWWI* No. 108 November-December 1987), p. 79.

53. Li Ch'iao; *op.cit.*, p. 41.

54. Although the commitment of the 'Hsia-ch'ao' - group in the second opposition party came to an end when their members left the party during June and July 1988 they continue their activities in the labour movement and make preparations for the establishment of a second labour party, the 'Lao-kung-tang'.

TAIWAN

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